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oAbstract
Family Rewards represents the first test of a Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program
in the U.S., offering families incentives for children’s education, family preventive
health care and parents’ work and training. Using a randomized controlled trial, we
find that the program led to substantial reductions in poverty and hardship during
the 3 years in which the rewards were offered. The program also led to some effects
in each of the three areas of education, health and work, although the effects were
fairly modest or limited to certain subgroups.
JEL classification: I1, I2, I3, J1.
Keywords: Conditional cash transfers; Education; Health; Income1 Introduction
Incentives have become increasingly popular in the U.S. and other countries as a way
to influence individual decisions about schooling, health and work. Programs have
been tested that provide incentives for students to take and perform well on standard-
ized exams, to attend school, or to read books (Fryer 2011, Bettinger 2012; Angrist and
Lavy 2009). Other incentives are designed to encourage patients to adhere to medica-
tion regimes or to a weight loss plan (Volpp et al. 2008a, b; Sindelar 2008). The examples
are numerous, and the evidence to date suggests that in many cases these incentives can
affect behavior.
Incentives are also popular in lower- and middle-income countries in the form of
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs. From a handful of programs in Central
and South America (including Mexico’s well-known Opportunidades program), there
are now CCTs in most Latin American countries and in several African and Middle
Eastern countries. The programs typically offer families incentives for children’s school
attendance and use of health care services, and a series of reviews suggests that they have
increased service use in both areas (Fiszbein and Shady 2009; Saavedra and Garcia 2012;
IEG Independent Evaluation Group 2011).
In 2007, the Center for Economic Opportunity within the New York City Mayor’s
Office decided to implement and test a version of a CCT in New York City. The pro-
gram, called Opportunity NYC - Family Rewards, was offered to low-income families
in several high poverty neighborhoods and provided incentives (or cash rewards) for2015 Miller et al. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
reativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
riginal work is properly credited.
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and parents’ employment. As with other CCTs, the intent of the program was to reduce
family poverty and hardships in the short term through the cash transfers and in the
long term by encouraging families to make these investments in their own human
capital.
When the program was launched, it sparked a great deal of interest and speculation
about whether a traditional CCT would work in the very different context of a high in-
come country and within that, the somewhat unique context of New York City. This
paper presents interim findings from the evaluation, following families for 3 to 4 years
after they entered the study.1 The program is being evaluated using a randomized
controlled trial in which low-income families with an entering 4th, 7th, or 9th grader
were randomized either to a program group, offered the program, or to a control group
that was not offered the program.
We find that the program led to substantial reductions in poverty and hardship during
the 3 years that the rewards were offered. Our “intent-to-treat” estimates, for example,
indicate that the program reduced the poverty rate by 11 percentage points. It also led to
some behavioral responses in each of the three areas of education, health and work,
although the effects were fairly modest or limited to certain subgroups. The most notable
and lasting effects include an increase in grade progression and graduation rates among a
subgroup of more academically prepared students who entered the study as 9th graders
and an increase in dental visits among all family members. The program also led to a
small increase in parents’ employment rates, although much of this new work was in jobs
that were not covered by the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system.
The findings add not only to the accumulating evidence on CCTs in other countries
but to the growing literature studying more targeted incentives programs in the U.S. As
one example, our findings for entering 9th graders are consistent with other research
suggesting that the effects of incentives for school performance tend to be concentrated
on higher ability students (Bettinger 2012; Angrist and Lavy 2009; Leuven et al. 2010).
As another example, the potential for a CCT to reduce work effort through income
effects is always a concern, and we provide evidence on the existence and magnitude of
such effects for a U.S. sample. Finally, some researchers and policymakers have consid-
ered building the CCT idea into the existing U.S. safety net. The findings presented
here regarding the amount families earned and the program’s effects on income, pov-
erty and other behaviors can inform the design of such a policy.
2 Background
2.1 Related research
The idea for Family Rewards came from the CCTs that have become popular in lower-
and middle-income countries. One of the first programs, and the one that has been the
most studied, is Mexico’s Opportunidades program, launched as PROGRESA in 1997.2
However, there are now CCT programs of varying scope and scale in nearly all Latin
American countries, as well as in several countries in Africa and the Middle East. Most
of the programs, which often are the main safety net program in the country, offer in-
centives for education (for school age children) and health (for very young children),
while a few target only education. Some are offered broadly to all low-income families
in an area, while others are targeted to specific populations of concern.
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consumption, with larger effects in programs that offer bigger transfers. These pro-
grams have also generally led to increases in school attendance.3 The effects have been
larger at the secondary level, since attendance at the primary level is already fairly high,
and they have been larger in areas or countries where attendance rates would have
been lowest in the absence of the program. In addition, there is some evidence that the
educational impacts are larger among the poorest households. Similarly, the programs
have also increased the use of health services, with parents in the program more likely
than other parents to take their children to visit health clinics (Fiszbein and Shady
2009; Lagarde et al. 2007).
However, there is no consistent evidence that this increased use of services improved
outcomes. A recent survey by Baird et al. (2014), for example, finds that although one
or two individual programs did seem to improve test scores, overall the effect of CCTs
on achievement is “small, at best.” While none of them rewarded performance per se,
the expectation was that students would learn more if they attended more. Some re-
searchers attribute the lack of effects to poor schools and poor home environments,
neither of which was addressed by the CCTs. The exception to this finding is for very
young children, where some studies suggest cognitive gains for children who were pre-
school age when their families participated (Paxson and Shady 2010). Similarly, the evi-
dence is mixed on whether the programs have improved children’s health. Some programs
have been found to increase height among the youngest children, while others have had
no effects on health status (Fiszbein and Shady 2009).
More recently, research on CCTs has started looking at longer-term effects on chil-
dren’s outcomes, with encouraging findings. For example, Baez and Camacho (2011)
find continued positive effects after 9 years of a Colombian CCT on graduation rates.
Studying a program in Nicaragua, Barham et al. (2013) find effects after 10 years on
educational attainment and test scores. Another more recent line of research has exam-
ined the impact of conditional versus unconditional transfers, sometimes through
meta-analyses (Baird et al. 2014) and sometimes through direct comparisons within a
single experiment (Baird et al. 2011; Benhassine et al. forthcoming; Akresh et al. 2013).
Although only a small number of studies, the findings suggest that both types of trans-
fers have positive effects on schooling but that conditionality tends to lead to larger ef-
fects, particularly for more marginal students.
Incentives have also become more prevalent in the U.S. and other higher-income
countries as a way to influence behavior in each of the domains targeted by Family
Rewards. These programs tend to differ from Family Rewards in that they are not holistic,
but instead targeted to one area or outcome. For example, a growing number of studies
have tested financial incentives to increase student performance. At the elementary and
secondary level, incentives have been offered to increase reading time, test performance
and course taking (Bettinger 2012; Jackson 2010; Fryer 2011). At the college level, there
are programs to increase grades, courses taken and persistence (Patel and Rudd 2012;
Leuven et al. 2010; Angrist et al. 2009). The research most relevant to Family Rewards in-
clude tests of targeted incentives in four large U.S. school districts, including New York
City (Fryer 2011), a study of incentives for test performance in rural Ohio (Bettinger
2012) and a study of incentives given to Israeli high school students to take and pass high
school exit exams (Angrist and Lavy 2009).
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least in the short-run. For example, the Israeli program encouraged more students to
take and pass required high school exams, largely by encouraging some students to
spend more time studying. However, it is not always clear that this increased effort
while the incentives were offered translated into higher achievement in the long-run.
The program tested in rural Ohio for performance on annual, standardized tests found
positive effects on math scores during the program but no effects in later years when
the rewards were not offered (Bettinger 2012).
Another finding from several of these studies is that the incentives had larger effects
on students on the margin of higher performance, or students who were within reach
of the outcome that was rewarded (Bettinger 2012; Angrist and Lavy 2009; Leuven
et al. 2010). For example, the positive effects on math test scores for elementary school
students in rural Ohio were larger for students with higher pre-program math scores.
The program that rewarded the passing of high school exit exams in Israel similarly
had larger effects for more prepared students.
Finally, an ongoing concern with offering incentives is that they may reduce students’
intrinsic motivation to perform well in school once the incentives are removed (Deci
et al. 2001). While the existing literature does not provide much evidence to suggest
that performance incentives reduce students’ intrinsic motivation, it is nonetheless an
important outcome to consider.4
In the health domain, a growing research documents that incentives can affect a var-
iety of health-related behaviors, such as weight loss (Volpp et al., 2008b), smoking
(Volpp et al. 2009) and adherence to prescribed medication (Volpp et al. 2008a). In
addition, one summary of studies found that the majority of incentives programs revie-
wed—providing rewards in the form of cash, lotteries, gifts, or coupons—were found to
affect individuals’ behavior (Kane et al. 2004). Another review suggests that the pay-
ments need not be large to affect a variety of health-related outcomes (Sindelar 2008).
However, most of the U.S. studies are small, clinical trials, and most of them only
studied behavior change in the short-term. In the few studies that did track long-term
outcomes, the effects typically faded after the program ended. In addition, there is lim-
ited evidence, to our knowledge, of studies examining incentives to obtain and maintain
health insurance.
Finally, in the work domain, none of the major CCTs in low- and middle-income
countries has included rewards for parents’ work or training, although there was con-
cern that the provision of education and health rewards may lead to a reduction in
adults’ work effort. In general, evaluations have not found negative effects on work,
with the exception of one program in Nicaragua, where the rewards were quite large
(Fiszbein and Shady 2009).
The use of incentives to encourage work has a long history in U.S., with the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC), perhaps the best and biggest example of such a policy, pro-
viding benefits to more than 27 million families. A range of studies suggest that expan-
sions in the EITC significantly increased the employment rates of single mothers (Holt
2006; Eissa and Hoynes 2006). A number of recent randomized trials have also tested
programs that provide monthly earnings supplements for full time employment or re-
wards for sustained work (Michalopoulos 2005; Hendra et al. 2011; Martinson and
Hendra 2006). In general, these programs do increase work, in some cases by moving
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full time. In several of the program studied, the effects on employment faded over time,
even before the incentives had ended, meaning that the main effect of the incentives
was to move individuals into work more quickly than they would have gone otherwise.
However, for some groups who would have had low employment rates in the absence
of the program, the effects can last longer.
The evidence for training incentives is more mixed. Some recent programs targeted
to welfare recipients or low-wage workers in general have increased the take up of
training and the receipt of certificates. However, the lack of sustained earnings effects
for these same programs suggests that the training that people were induced to take up
may not have had much return in the labor market (Hendra et al. 2011; Miller et al.
2012).
2.2 Family rewards
Family Rewards is the first CCT program to be piloted in the U.S. The program was de-
signed by the Center for Economic Opportunity within the Mayor’s Office, MDRC, a
nonprofit social policy evaluation firm and Seedco, a workforce and economic develop-
ment organization. It offered cash rewards to low-income families for meeting a variety
of activities and outcomes related to children’s educational efforts and achievement,
family preventive health care practices and parents’ employment. The intent of the pro-
gram was to reduce family poverty and hardships in the short term through the cash
transfers and in the long term by supporting and encouraging families to invest in their
own health, education and employment potential. The program offered participants
cash rewards for 3 years, from late 2007 to late 2010.
At the outset, Family Rewards offered families cash rewards for 22 different behaviors
(Table 1). In the education domain, rewards were offered for parents’ attendance at
parent-teacher conferences, children’s high attendance in school, their performance on
standardized tests, their completion of adequate credits per year, their passing of exams
required to graduate and their graduation. For example, elementary students could earn
$25 every month for achieving high attendance, and high school students could earn
$50 every month. Elementary school students could earn $300 per test for scoring at
the proficient level or higher on their standardized Math and English Language Arts
(ELA) tests, while high school students could earn $600 for every Regents exam passed
(students are required to pass five exams to graduate with a New York State Regents
diploma).
In the health domain, rewards were offered for maintaining health coverage and for
preventive medical and dental checkups for each family member. For example, families
could earn $20 each month for having public health coverage and $200 each year (per
family member) for making two preventive visits to the dentist. In the work domain,
parents were offered $150 per month for sustained full-time work and up to $3,000 for
pursuing education or training while working.
Part of the strategy behind offering multiple rewards within each domain was to help
generate a significant effect on income and poverty. The program was designed so that
a family receiving all or most of the rewards would receive a substantial cash transfer,
equal to about 25–30% of family income. A single mother with two school-aged chil-
dren, for example, could earn over $3,000 per year from the education rewards, $1,700
Table 1 Family rewards activities and reward amounts
Activitiy Reward amount
Education
Student has 95%+ attendance $25 per month grades 1-8a; $50 per month grades 9–12
Parent attend parent-teacher meeting $25 per meeting, twice per year
Student obtains library carda $50, paid once
Parent review low-stakes tests $25 per review, grades 1–8 only
Student obtain proficient score - Math $300, grades 3–5; $350 grades 6–8
Student obtain proficient score - ELA $300, grades 3–5; $350 grades 6–8
Parent discuss test results with teachera $25 per test
Student passes Regents exams $600 per exam (up to 5 exams) - grades 9–12
Student earns 11+ credits per year $600 per year - grades 9–12
Student takes PSAT $50 - grades 9–12
Student graduates $400 - grades 9–12
Health
Maintain public health insurancea $20 per month for each parent; $20 per month for each child
Maintain private health insurancea $20 per month for each parent; $20 per month for each child
Annual medical check up $200 per family member
Dental check up twice per year $100 per family member
Doctor-advised follow-up visita $100 per family member
Work and training
Sustained full-time work $150 per month
Participation in education/training
While working 10+ hours/weekb $200–$600 per course (max $3,000)
a Reward dropped for program Year 3
b Minimum work requirement eliminated for program Year 3
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wards meant that families had multiple opportunities to earn money. If some rewards
remained out of reach, others were not.
There were some modifications to the incentive schedule at the end of the second
year, also noted on Table 1. In an effort to simplify the program and reduce its costs,
several rewards were eliminated, including those for maintaining health coverage and
for high attendance for elementary and middle school students.
Families received payments every 2 months, covering all rewards earned during a
given payment period. Rewards were verified using automated data (such as test score
data from the Department of Education) and coupons submitted by families (such as
for visits to the doctor). Families without bank accounts were encouraged to open ac-
counts in order to receive the payments electronically.5 A small fraction of families pre-
ferred to receive payments on stored value cards. The head of household, usually a
single mother, received the payments for all health and workforce rewards earned by
the family and any education rewards earned by elementary or middle school children.
The parent also received half the value of some education rewards earned by high
school students. For example, high school students received the full amount earned for
passing Regents exams, but half of the amount earned for attendance, credits earned
and graduation.
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Staff at the CBOs did not develop plans with families to earn the rewards, follow up
with families during the program, or provide direct services, such as tutoring, test prep-
aration, or job search assistance, although they could refer individuals to these services.
Services were excluded from the model in order to test the incentives offer alone. In
addition, it was expected that families in New York City would have access to services
through other programs in the community.2.3 The evaluation
Seedco administered and oversaw the program. The agency selected six community
based organizations (CBOs) in each targeted community district to recruit families and
implement the program. The CBOs began recruiting families for the study in July 2007,
using lists of likely eligible families obtained from the New York City Department of
Education. The lists contained the names and contact information for families who
lived in the targeted areas, who had children expected to enter 4th, 7th, or 9th grade in
September 2007 and whose children were enrolled in the National School Lunch pro-
gram, which was open to families with incomes at or below 130% of the federal poverty
line. Staff enrolled approximately 4,800 families between July and December 2007,
with most families entering before October 2007.
Families were assigned at random to the program group, eligible to enroll in Family
Rewards, or a control group. Once in the program, all children in the family were eli-
gible for the education and health rewards. The study sample includes over 11,000 chil-
dren, the majority of whom are in the three target grades.
Table 2 presents selected characteristics of the sample at baseline. The majority
(81%) of families are headed by a single parent (typically the mother), and the families are
fairly large, with an average of 2.5 children. The sample consists primarily of Hispanic or
Black families, representing the racial and ethnic makeup of the targeted neighborhoods.
About 60% of parents had a GED or higher education level at study entry, and half of
them were working.
The bottom panel presents the data on school level for all children enrolled in the
study. About half of the children were set to enroll in one of the three target grades
(4th, 7th, or 9th) at study entry, while the remainder was either too young for school or
set to enroll in another grade. As noted below, for ease of interpretation, we focus the
analysis of school outcomes on children entering the target grades. The findings were
similar when we included children in all grades.2.4 Program implementation
The implementation of the program was examined through site visits, interviews with
staff and participants and analyses of payment data and program documents. Overall,
the program was implemented as designed, particularly by year 2 when the early oper-
ational challenges were overcome. Several features of the design and implementation
may affect how families interact with the program and its ultimate effects.
First, psychological studies on behavior associated with earning rewards suggest that
it is important that incentives be understood and translatable into specific action by po-
tential recipients (Eisenberger et al. 1999). There was some evidence of early confusion




Average number of children in household 2.5
Primary language spoken at home is Spanish 0.217
Receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistance 0.240









GED or high school diploma 0.260
Some college 0.197




Grade set to enter
Not yet school-aged 0.095
Kindergarten through 5th 0.348
4th (target grade) 0.167
6th through 8th 0.242
7th (target grade) 0.161
9th through 12th 0.292
9th (target grade) 0.186
N 11331
Source: Baseline survey and New York City DOE records
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pected challenge of recruiting eligible and interested families into the study, for ex-
ample, overlapped with the task of getting the program up and running in the first few
months. As a result, the CBOs were sometimes not able to provide families with ad-
equate orientations to the program. Although site visits determined that most of the
CBOs delivered this information in a clear and concise way, these initial orientations
varied in quality. Staff were sometimes challenged to explain detailed rules for the pro-
gram’s different activities while also welcoming them and encouraging them to take ad-
vantage of the program.
Data from the 18-month survey indicate that parents had a good but very general un-
derstanding of the rewards. As an example, over 90% of parents reported knowing that a
reward was offered for their children’s good attendance, but only 27% of parents knew
that the reward required attending 95% of school days. Also, about 60% of parents re-
ported that the program included a reward for good behavior in school, when it did not.
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activities, but, instead, encouraged them to obtain rewards for the activities they were
already doing. Thus, some parents may have avoided focusing on certain activities, such
as work and test-taking, which they may have felt were less in their control. The large
number of rewards may have also overwhelmed participants and encouraged them to
focus on just a few.
Second, a basic tenet of learning theory emphasizes the need for rewards to be close
in time to the desired behavior (Skinner 1974). Although a cash transfer system was
successfully developed, there were inevitable delays between meeting certain conditions
and reward receipt, even beyond the regular two-month program payment cycle. For
example, the results of the annual standardized ELA and math tests were not available
until months after the tests were taken because of the time required by New York State
to grade the exams and for New York City to process the results and provide the data
to the program. This delay may reduce the salience of these particular rewards.
Finally, trust between the reward giver and the reward seeker has been identified as a
potential factor influencing motivation (Benabou and Tirole 2003). Although the types
of frustrations experienced by some Family Rewards participants are not unusual for
cash transfer programs, which might diminish motivation, the CBOs and the helpline
created a good degree of trust for the program—through dedicated customer service,
community-building social events and clear explanations of rules for payment and their
legitimacy. Customer service and support was provided in two ways. Participants could
either call the helpline or they could call or visit the CBOs. The helpline provided bilin-
gual support to Family Rewards participants, primarily to answer questions about
payment.
Table 3 presents reward receipt rates and amounts for families in the program group.
Nearly all families received at least some rewards in the education and health domains,
while only about half ever earned a work reward. The average family earned over
$3,100 in the first 2 years of the program and $2,400 in year 3. Dollar amounts include
zeroes for families that did not earn any rewards. The fall in receipt rates between years
two and three reflects the elimination of the attendance reward for younger students
and the reward for maintaining health insurance.Table 3 Rewards earned by families in the program group
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Yrs 1–3
Ever earned a reward (%)
Education 0.964 0.915 0.825 0.979
Health 0.952 0.942 0.727 0.980
Work 0.422 0.421 0.419 0.532
Any 0.995 0.980 0.891 0.996
Amount earned ($)
Education 1,398 1,351 1,150 3,899
Health 1,165 1,174 639 2,978
Work 574 605 617 1,797
Total 3,137 3,131 2,406 8,674
N = 2377
Source: Family Rewards payment information system
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3.1 Data
We use data from several sources. First, all participants filled out a baseline survey
prior to study entry, providing demographic and other information for adults and chil-
dren in the household. Records data are available from the New York City Department
of Education for the full sample of school-aged children, with information on attend-
ance rates, test scores, credits earned, Regents exam scores and graduation. Records
data are also available from the agency managing the payment system on reward pay-
ments made to families throughout the three-year period. Unemployment Insurance
(UI) records provide information for every adult in the sample on quarterly earnings re-
ported to the UI system. As is well-known, these records miss some types of employ-
ment that are either exempt from reporting to the UI system (self-employment, federal
government employment, domestic work) or underreported (Abraham et al. 2013).
Two surveys were fielded to a randomly selected subset of the full sample, at 18 and
42 months after study entry. The surveys included modules covering participants’ un-
derstanding of and experiences with the program, income and material hardship, em-
ployment and earnings, health care status and use of health services and parental
engagement in children’s schooling. The survey sample was drawn by first selecting
families who had entered the study by October 31, 2007, representing 86% of all fam-
ilies in the study. This sample was then stratified by the entering grade of the target
children, e.g., 4th, 7th, or 9th grade. Then a random subset of 1,250 families was se-
lected for the survey from each stratum, for a total fielded sample of 3,750 families. Fi-
nally, given the length of the survey, certain modules were administered to randomly
selected subsets of the full sample.
The 18-month survey achieved a response rate of 84% for the program group and
80% for the control group. The 42-month survey achieved response rates of 82% for
the program group and 76% for the control group. Both of these differences are statis-
tically significant. Nonetheless, the survey samples are generally representative of the
full sample, and program and control group respondents are well-matched on baseline
characteristics (see Table 4). In addition, we performed two checks to assess the balance
and representativeness of the survey samples. First, we compared effects on administra-
tive records outcomes for the full sample and the two survey samples. The impacts
were generally similar across the three samples (see Table 5). Second, we assessed the
sensitivity of the results to weighting, with weights equal to the inverse probability of
predicted response for each survey. In general, the results were very similar using
weighted data. The one exception was for selected health effects for the 18-month sur-
vey. In general, however, the results of these analyses suggest that the survey samples
provide valid estimates of program effects and are representative of the full research
sample.
3.2 Methods
We use the following equation to estimate the effects of being offered the Family Rewards
program:
yihc ¼ βo þ β1Thc þ β2Xihc þ cdc þ εih;
where yih denotes the outcome for individual i in family h in community district c, and








Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Target child proficient on ELA test, 2007 0.01 0.886 0.100 0.248 0.097 0.273
Target child proficient on math test, 2007 0.094 0.172 0.096 0.256 0.091 0.291
Community District 2 −0.01 0.927 −0.113 0.427 −0.068 0.616
Community District 3 0.031 0.756 −0.062 0.648 −0.010 0.937
Community District 4 0.007 0.94 −0.059 0.625 −0.052 0.674
Community District 5 0.014 0.897 −0.027 0.848 0.023 0.863
Community District 6 −0.019 0.867 0.065 0.612 −0.096 0.491
Number of children in household −0.015 0.525 −0.009 0.763 −0.019 0.521
Primary language spoken at home is English 0.011 0.913 0.001 0.993 −0.017 0.896
Two-parent family 0.088 0.259 0.179 0.071 0.159 0.114
High school diploma, GED certificate, or above −0.148 0.021 −0.068 0.394 −0.061 0.453
Currently working 0.027 0.677 0.077 0.356 0.041 0.626
Randomly assigned after September 2008 −0.034 0.611 −0.013 0.891 0.000 0.996
Black, non-Hispanic/Latino 0.344 0.105 0.433 0.141 0.373 0.192
Hispanic/Latino 0.369 0.087 0.504 0.089 0.449 0.120
U.S. citizen by birth 0.113 0.145 0.058 0.557 0.098 0.327
Age 0.002 0.512 0.010 0.022 0.009 0.061
Family living in public housing or receiving
Section 8 −0.116 0.063 −0.169 0.031 −0.165 0.039
Family receiving TANF or Safety Net Assistance 0.098 0.197 0.100 0.297 0.120 0.215
Covered by public health insurance −0.007 0.914 0.009 0.920 −0.061 0.516
Likelihood ratio 25.3 0.657 30.4 0.444 24.2 0.719
Wald statistic 25.1 0.671 29.8 0.473 23.9 0.735
N 4749 3082 2966
Sources: Baseline survey and New York City DOE records
Each column presents logit estimates from a model predicting the probability of being in the program group
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Family Rewards group or to the control group. The vector Xihc includes family and indi-
vidual covariates that are correlated with the outcomes of interest and are included for in-
creased precision.6 Family-level variables include family structure, number of children and
primary language spoken at home. Parent-level variables include race/ethnicity, educa-
tional attainment, marital status and prior work experience. When yihc includes outcomes
in the education domain for children, Xihc also includes the child’s gender, special edu-
cation status and scores for the Math and ELA tests in the year prior to entering
the study. The coefficient on Thc is the key coefficient of interest and represents
the effect of the program offer. The variable cdc includes community district fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the household level for models that esti-
mate effects on individual outcomes.
Given that families were assigned at random to receive the offer of Family Rewards,
β1 represents an unbiased estimate of the effect of the program offer. Unbiased effects
can be estimated in this way, assuming that the randomization process was carried
out successfully and that the treatment and control groups are similar on baseline
Table 5 Effects for the full and survey respondent samples
Control mean Effect P-value
Ever employed (UI RECORDS)
Year 1
Full sample 58.7 −2.4** 0.013
18-month survey respondents 58.6 −1.4 0.222
42-month survey respondents 59.0 −2.0* 0.094
Year 2
Full sample 56.3 −1.0 0.373
42-month survey respondents 56.1 −0.1 0.951
Year 3
Full sample 53.5 −1.0 0.385
42-month survey respondents 53.5 −0.4 0.782
Annual earnings (UI RECORDS)
Year 1
Full sample 12177 −159 0.482
18-month survey respondents 12089 243 0.399
42-month survey respondents 11806 254 0.376
Year 2
Full sample 12486 −194 0.504
42-month survey respondents 12332 −55 0.879
Year 2
Full sample 12406 −76 0.817
42-month survey respondents 12159 231 0.564
Attempted 11+ credits, among 9th graders (DOE records)
Year 1
Full sample 86.2 4.2*** 0.004
18-month survey respondents 83.6 6.3*** 0.001
42-month survey respondents 86.7 5.5*** 0.004
Year 2
Full sample 80.6 3.1* 0.095
42-month survey respondents 83.9 2.9 0.218
Year 3
Full sample 71.1 3.5 0.101
42-month survey respondents 77.4 4.2 0.127
Year 4
Full sample 50.4 −2.4 0.339
42-month survey respondents 54.0 −3.8 0.282
Sources: Baseline survey and UI and DOE records
Impacts are shown for the 18-month respondents only for Year 1. Each estimate represents the coefficient on program
status from a linear regression controlling for selected baseline characteristics. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering
at the household level
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: ***=1 %; **=5 %; *=10 %
Miller et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:11 Page 12 of 29characteristics. As shown in Table 4, there are few differences in characteristics between
the program and group groups, for the full sample and for each of the two survey re-
spondent samples. In addition, the p-values for the logit models predicting program group
status are above .40 for each of the three samples (see second from last row).
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4.1 Income and material hardship
Table 6 presents the program’s effects on income and material hardship, using data
from the 18- and 42-month surveys. A measure of income including rewards is based
on the survey question asking respondents about total income in the month prior to
the survey. We then estimate rewards earned per month by dividing rewards earned in
year 2 (or year 3 for the 42-month survey) by 12.7 Income including rewards at the 42-
month point, therefore, is an estimate of the program’s effect during the third year of
the program. In contrast, income without rewards at the 42-month point indicates fam-
ilies’ status after they were no longer receiving rewards.
The program increased monthly income by over 20%, or by about $360, in each
period, effects that were statistically significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the program
led to a reduction in poverty of 11 percentage points to 12 percentage points. Although
not shown in the table, the program also led to a reduction in severe poverty (or in-
come below 50% of the poverty line), indicating that its effects were fairly widespread
across the income distribution.
When rewards are not included in the measure of income, the program’s effects be-
come much smaller (a 5% increase) but are still positive and statistically significant at
the 10% level, owing to an increase in the fraction of respondents’ who reported havingTable 6 Effects on poverty and material well-being
18-month survey 42-month survey
Control Standard Control Standard
Outcome Mean Effect Error Mean Effect Error
A. Income and poverty
Monthly income ($)
(including rewards)
1573 366 50*** 1620 353 49***
Income below poverty
(including rewards)
0.700 −0.111 0.021*** 0.682 −0.122 0.021***
Monthly income ($)
(without rewards)
1573 85 49* 1620 79 48*
Income below poverty
(without rewards)
0.700 −0.024 0.020 0.682 −0.020 0.020
B. Material well-being
Financial well-being
(4 =min, 16 =max)
8.72 0.460 [.199] 0.102*** 8.76 0.266 [.108] 0.111**
Food security (1 = min, 4 =max) 3.21 0.159 [.184] 0.038*** 3.29 0.123 [.144] 0.038***
C. Banking and savings
Has bank account 0.518 0.215 0.020*** 0.466 0.175 0.021***
Reports any savings 0.163 0.094 0.018*** 0.168 0.078 0.018***
Savings amount ($) 354 221 90*** 361 80 79
N 2060 1982
Sources: Baseline survey and 18- and 42-month surveys
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression, controlling for baseline
characteristics. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %. Effects measured in standard
deviations (effect sizes) are presented in [brackets]
Financial well-being is coded as the sum of responses to four questions about respondents’ current financial status, such
as “My financial situation is better than it’s been in a long time” and “I worry about having enough money in the future.”
Responses were coded such that a lower score indicates greater financial strain
Food security describes food eaten by the family in the prior month: 1 = often not enough to eat: 2 = sometimes not enough
to eat; 3 = enough to eat but not always the kinds of food desired; and 4 = enough to eat of the kinds of food desired
Miller et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:11 Page 14 of 29earnings. At the 42-month point, for example, the program increase the fraction of re-
spondents’ reporting own earnings by 9 percentage points, significant at the 1% level.
However, without the reward, the program had no effects on poverty rates.
The second panel of the table presents effects on two measures of material
hardship—a scale score based on parents’ responses to four questions asking about
their current financial situation and a measure of food security based on responses to a
question about the adequacy of food in the household over the prior month. The program
led to small reductions in these measures of hardship, with effects ranging from .10 to .19
standard deviations. Food security status at the 42-month point is the only measure in this
panel that is capturing status post-program, suggesting a continued effect at least through
the fourth year.8 Although the table only reports two measures of material hardship, the
program also reduced hardship as measured by several other measures (not reported),
such as borrowing from family or friends or using a pawn shop.
The final panel presents effects on banking and savings. When they entered the
study, just over 50% of parents had a bank account. By encouraging families to open
bank accounts in order to receive rewards payments and offering them an attractive al-
ternative to a typical bank account, the program led to a substantial increase in the
number of families who were “banked.” Similarly, only about 16% of families in the
control group reported having any savings at the time of the survey, and the program
increased the incidence of savings by about 8 percentage points at the 42-month point.
On average, families in the control group reported about $360 in savings at both survey
points, including zeros for those with no savings. While the program increased average
savings at the 18-month point, the effect was small and statistically insignificant by the
42-month point. We also examine the program’s effects on debt and found no signifi-
cant effects on the amount or repayment of debt.
While the program did lead to substantial increases in income while families received
rewards, the findings do not suggest that these effects will continue into the longer
term. Post-program effects on well-being were predicated on the existence of increased
work by parents or by increased savings, and effects on both of these outcomes, al-
though statistically significant, are relatively small.
4.2 Education
The education rewards were designed to affect educational inputs and outputs. Stu-
dents were incentivized to attend school regularly, obtain a library card, take a full
course load and peform well on relevant exams. Parents were rewarded for attendance
at parent-teacher conferences, in an attempt to increase parental involvement. As noted
above, a family consisting of a single mother with two older children could earn more
than $3,000 per year if they earned all of the offered education rewards.
We decided at the outset of the analysis to examine each of the three target grades
separately, given the different developmental stage of each grade, the different rewards
offered and the different outcomes of interest. Also, given the relative ease of interpret-
ing results for one grade cohort over time, findings are presented only for students in
each of the three target grades, e.g., for entering 4th graders rather than for all entering
elementary school-aged children. The target grades represent the majority of students
in each broader grade range, and the findings were similar when students in other
grades were included in the analysis.
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had a very small effects on parental engagement. In addition, the increases in parents’
attendance at parent-teacher conferences or an increase in the rate at which parents re-
ported interacting with their children around school (e.g., checking homework, help
preparing for tests) were on top of very high levels of engagement among parents in
the control group. The most consistent effect across all age groups was an increase in
the number of students who had a library card and who visited the library (obtaining a
library card was a rewarded activity).
Data from the New York City DOE records indicate that the program had no effect
on the school performance of entering 4th and 7th graders. The left panel of Table 7
presents results for entering 4th graders. The data show that 86% of these 4th graders
were on grade in the fourth year of follow-up, or enrolled in 7th grade, as they should
have been if promoted each year. The program had no effects on enrollment status or
grade promotion.
Similarly, point estimates for attendance and proficiency rates on math and ELA tests
are small and statistically insignificant.9 Students in New York City schools take annual
standardized tests in the 3rd through 8th grades and their proficiency rates are deter-
mined by score cutoffs set by the New York State Department of Education. (Although
the table only presents effects on proficiency rates, effects were also small and statisti-
cally insignificant for average test scores).
The table shows that proficiency rates on these two tests fall dramatically for students
in the control group between the second and third years of follow-up. For example,
79% of these students were proficient on Math in Year 2, while only 42% were profi-
cient in Year 3. In 2010, amid concerns that these tests had become too easy and were
not reflective of the proficiency needed in each grade, the New York State Department
of Education raised the scores necessary to be deemed proficient. In 2009 and earlier, a
score a 650 or higher was required in order to be deemed proficient. Starting in 2010,
the cutoff scores were raised to 658–684, depending on the grade level and the test. As
a result, proficiency rates citywide fell dramatically between 2009 and 2010, as they did
for students in the Family Rewards study.10
The right hand panel presents findings for entering 7th graders. For this group, stan-
dardized test scores are shown only in the first 2 years, since most of this cohort should
have entered 9th grade by year 3, when the relevant tests are Regents exams. By Year 4,
only 74% of the students in the control group were in the 10th grade. Most of the
remaining 26% of students had been held back at some point and were enrolled in an
earlier grade, and the remaining students had transferred out of the New York City
public school system. The Family Rewards program had no overall effects for entering
7th graders.
Table 8 presents effects for entering 9th graders. Overall, the program had little effect
for this group, with the most consistent effects being small increases in high attendance
in years one and two. In terms of completion rates, only 48% of this cohort of entering
9th graders had graduated high school by the end of Year 4, and the program had no
effect on this outcome.
In order to examine heterogeneity in effects, we pre-specified three dimensions
across which the program’s effect might vary—parents’ education level, the student’s
school environment (measured by the test performance of prior year’s grade cohorts)
Table 7 Effects on school progress - entering 4th and 7th graders
4th graders at entry 7th graders at entry
Control Standard Control Standard
Mean Effect Error Mean Effect Error
Year 4 status
On grade 0.855 −0.009 0.017 0.741 −0.039 0.022*
Enrolled in any grade 0.910 −0.007 0.014 0.917 −0.019 0.014
95%+ attendance rate
Yr 1 0.432 0.000 0.024 0.430 0.005 0.024
Yr 2 0.416 0.029 0.024 0.350 0.016 0.023
Yr 3 0.402 0.011 0.024 0.343 0.025 0.023
Yr 4 0.393 0.007 0.024 0.249 0.018 0.021
Proficient on Math test
Yr 1 0.712 0.021 0.018 0.596 0.008 0.019
Yr 2 0.786 0.017 0.018 0.635 −0.016 0.020
Yr 3 0.417 −0.013 0.022
Yr 4 0.431 0.013 0.023
Proficient on ELA test
Yr 1 0.511 −0.004 0.020 0.506 0.000 0.020
Yr 2 0.681 −0.005 0.020 0.460 0.005 0.020
Yr 3 0.291 −0.013 0.021
Yr 4 0.252 −0.004 0.020
Earned 11+ credits
Yr 1 - -
Yr 2 - -
Yr 3 - 0.507 0.002 0.024
Yr 4 - 0.485 −0.019 0.024
N 1726 1670
Source: Baseline survey and NYC DOE records
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression, controlling for selected
baseline characteristics
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %
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she scored at the proficient level or higher on the math or ELA exams).11 For 4th
graders and 7th graders, there was no significant variation in effects across these di-
mensions. For 9th graders, effects did not differ by parents’ education level or school
environment, but they did differ by the student’s prior year’s test performance.
The findings are presented in Tables 9 and 10. The left panel presents effects for en-
tering 9th graders who scored at the proficient level on the given test, while the right
panel presents effects for their non-proficient counterparts. The tables also show sig-
nificance levels of tests for the differences in effects between the proficient and less
proficient groups. As shown by the ‘+’ symbols, nearly all of the differences in effects
by ELA proficiency are statistically significant, while only a handful are significant by
math proficiency. When considering how to define academic preparedness, it was not
obvious which test to use—ELA or math—so we present both results in the table.
While scores on the two tests are highly correlated, about 40% of students who were




On grade 0.512 0.019 0.021
Enrolled in any grade 0.792 0.009 0.018
95%+ attendance rate
Yr 1 0.315 0.025 0.020
Yr 2 0.237 0.051 0.019***
Yr 3 0.219 0.031 0.018*
Yr 4 0.153 0.021 0.017
Earned 11+ credits
Yr 1 0.500 −0.003 0.021
Yr 2 0.454 −0.002 0.021
Yr 3 0.392 0.037 0.021*
Yr 4 0.315 0.001 0.021
Earned 44+ credits through year 4 0.405 0.009 0.021
# Regents exams passed 2.9 0.149 0.096
Graduated within 4 years 0.482 0.011 0.021
N 1978
Source: Baseline survey and NYC DOE records
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression, controlling for selected
baseline characteristics
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %
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multiple hypotheses, the results should be interpreted with the appropriate caveats.
However, they do show a similar pattern of larger program effects for more academic-
ally prepared students.
Effects on high attendance, for example, range from 10 percentage points to 13 per-
centage points for the ELA-proficient group and are somewhat smaller for the math-
proficient group. For both groups, the effects on attendance and credits earned end
after year 3. The program seems to have encouraged students to accumulate credits ne-
cessary for graduation (44 credits) more quickly, allowing them to cut back to the typ-
ical credits taken without the incentive in their final year.
The ELA-proficient group also shows a significant increase in completion. Among
these students, those in the program group were more likely to have earned at least 44
credits by the end of Year 4 (by 9.6 percentage points) and more likely to have gradu-
ated (by 8 percentage points). Both effects are significant at the 5% level and both ef-
fects are significantly different from the corresponding differences found for their
non-proficient counterparts. The effect on the graduation rate is fairly large and rivals
effects found in more intensive, school-based interventions (Bloom and Unterman
2012). In contrast, the program had no effects on these outcomes for the math-profi-
cient group.
While these results are consistent with other studies in finding larger effects for more
prepared students, it is not clear why the effects here are larger and more consistent
for students proficient in ELA. Given that reading and language skills are relevant and
Table 9 Effects on school progress for 9th graders, by 8th grade math score
Proficient in math Not proficient in math
Control Standard Control Standard
Mean Effect Error Mean Effect Error
Year 4 status
On grade 0.718 0.058 0.036 0.470 0.005 0.029
Enrolled in any grade 0.893 0.018 0.026 0.805 0.014 0.023
95%+ attendance rate
Yr 1 0.469 0.070 0.040* 0.269 0.021 0.026
Yr 2 0.367 0.141 0.040*** 0.194 0.024 0.024+
Yr 3 0.344 0.082 0.039** 0.181 0.010 0.024
Yr 4 0.232 0.056 0.037 0.132 0.008 0.023
Earned 11+ credits
Yr 1 0.689 0.085 0.036** 0.471 −0.036 0.029+
Yr 2 0.628 0.087 0.038** 0.415 −0.039 0.029+
Yr 3 0.575 0.067 0.040* 0.350 0.023 0.028
Yr 4 0.446 −0.024 0.042 0.294 0.012 0.023
Earned 44+ credits
Through year 4 0.617 0.041 0.039 0.368 0.001 0.028
# Regents exams passed 4.9 0.2 0.192 2.2 0.1 0.1
Graduated within 4 years 0.713 0.035 0.037 0.422 −0.005 0.029
N 583 1143
Source: Baseline survey and NYC DOE records
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression, controlling for selected
baseline characteristics
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %
Differences between impacts for proficient versus non-proficient groups were tested for statistical significance and are
indicated as follows: +++ = 1 %; ++ = 5 %; + = 10 %
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prepared to respond to the incentives offered by the program. On the other hand, as
the data for the control groups show, students proficient in math do as well as (or bet-
ter than) than those proficient in ELA, with slightly higher graduation rates. In this
case, the ELA-proficient group may simply contain more “marginal” students, or those
who would do better in school if they exerted additional effort.
4.3 Health
The health rewards were designed to increase the rate of preventive care obtained by
low-income families by encouraging parents to obtain and maintain health coverage
and to make routine preventive doctor and dentist visits for themselves and their chil-
dren. It was hoped that increased coverage and preventive care would then lead to less
reliance on emergency rooms for health problems, more treatment of existing condi-
tions and improved health status.
Table 11 presents effects on health coverage, use and status for parents. The high
levels of health coverage and preventive care among parents in the control group was
somewhat surprising. At the 18-month point, 94% of parents reported having health
coverage, and 92% reported having had a check up in the past year. Data from a na-
tionally representative sample of food stamp recipients, a comparable sample, show
Table 10 Effects on school progress for 9th graders, by 8th grade English Language Arts (ELA)
score
Proficient in ELA Not proficient in ELA
Control Standard Control Standard
Mean Effect Error Mean Effect Error
Year 4 status
On grade 0.682 0.101 0.038*** 0.503 −0.019 0.028
Enrolled in any grade 0.890 0.019 0.028 0.813 0.014 0.023++
95%+ attendance rate
Yr 1 0.423 0.126 0.041*** 0.295 0.001 0.026++
Yr 2 0.339 0.131 0.041*** 0.215 0.028 0.024++
Yr 3 0.308 0.095 0.040** 0.203 0.01 0.023+
Yr 4 0.230 0.052 0.038 0.143 0.005 0.021
Earned 11+ credits
Yr 1 0.661 0.102 0.039*** 0.495 −0.046 0.028+++
Yr 2 0.585 0.129 0.041*** 0.445 −0.065 0.028**/+++
Yr 3 0.534 0.118 0.042*** 0.379 −0.001 0.028++
Yr 4 0.438 −0.009 0.045 0.31 0.001 0.027
Earned 44+ credits
Through year 4 0.566 0.096 0.042** 0.398 −0.028 0.028++
# Regents exams passed 4.6 0.5 0.189** 2.5 −0.01 0.124++
Graduated within 4 years 0.669 0.080 0.040** 0.459 −0.028 0.028++
N 527 1173
Source: Baseline survey and NYC DOE records
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression, controlling for selected
baseline characteristics
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %
Differences between impacts for proficient versus non-proficient groups were tested for statistical significance and are
indicated as follows: +++ = 1 %; ++ = 5 %; + = 10 %
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flects efforts by the City and State over the past decade to improve access to health care
coverage and to improve the health delivery system for low- and moderate-income
families.12 In addition, the study sample does not include undocumented immigrants
or singles without children, two groups with historically low coverage rates.
At the 18-month point, the program led to small improvements in several health in-
puts and outcomes. Parents in the program group were more likely than those in the
control group to have health insurance, to have visited the dentist and to report treat-
ing a specific health condition. They also reported better health, with an effect of .08
standard deviations on the self-reported health status scale. By the 42-month point,
however, only the effects on health coverage and dental visits had persisted. There is
also some suggestion that parents in the program group reported better mental health,
as measured by effects on the state of hope scale. The effect on this scale at the
18-month point was significant at the 11% level.13
Effects for children are shown in Table 12. The program’s strongest and most consist-
ent effect was also to increase the rate of dental visits. Over 85% of children in the
control groups had visited a dentist at least once during the year. As the table indicates,
however, a much lower percent makes the recommended two visits. The importance of
Table 11 Effects on parents’ health care and status
18-month survey 42-month survey
Control Standard Control Standard
Mean Effect Error Mean Effect Error
A. Health coverage and use
Had health insurance in prior month 0.937 0.019 0.008** 0.929 0.027 0.009***
Had health check up in past year 0.917 0.015 0.01 0.889 0.011 0.014
Had 2+ dental visits in past year 0.579 0.095 0.018*** 0.335 0.118 0.022***
B. Health status
Self-rated health status (1 = poor; 5 = excellent) 3.1 0.093 0.037** 3.1 0.064 0.046
Being treated for medical condition 0.444 0.028 0.017* 0.478 0.023 0.021
State of hope scale (6 =min; 24 =max) 17.3 0.198 0.123 17.5 0.339 0.119***
N 3082 1961
Sources: Baseline survey and 18- and 42-month surveys
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression, controlling for selected
baseline characteristics
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %
The state of hope scale is constructed from six questions designed to capture the level of goal-directed thinking
Each of the questions ranges from 1 to 4, with lower numbers representing less goal-directed thinking
See Snyder et al. (1996)
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cess to oral health services (Fisher-Owens et al. 2008). Poor oral health can affect chil-
dren in the short run but can also lead to a number of more serious medical conditions
as they age.14 Medicaid covers a portion of dental visit costs, but many dentists do not
accept patients covered by public insurance. Although there are a number of clinics in
New York City offering free or reduced-cost dental care, getting preventive dental care
nonetheless requires that low-income families search out these clinics and pay some-
times a small cost for this care.
4.4 Work and training
Family Rewards encouraged work by offering participants $300 every 2 months if they
worked at least 30 hours per week for six out of every 8 weeks. For a parent working
40 hours per week at $8 per hour, for example, the reward effectively increases her net
wage by 11%, to $8.90 per hour. Offering incentives for work and training is not a new
idea, and there is evidence from earlier programs that these incentives can increase
work and, in some cases, training (Hendra et al. 2011; Martinson and Hendra 2006;
Michalopoulos 2005). What is new, however, is that these incentives are part of a larger
package of rewards. This structure, in which families can earn rewards through a range
of activities, has two potential implications for the program’s effects on work. First, the
large menu of options might encourage individuals to focus on some, easier to achieve,
activities to the exclusion of other, more challenging activities. Second, the additional
money families earn from the other rewards may reduce work effort through income
effects.
Table 13 presents effects on employment and earnings, using data from the surveys
and UI records. The program led to an increase in parents’ reported employment on
the survey, at both the 18- and 42-month points. Data on the job held at the 42-month
point show that the program also increased full-time employment by 5.5 percentage
points, suggesting that most of the additional employment induced by the program
Table 12 Effects on children’s health care use and status
18-month survey 42-month survey
Control Standard Control Standard
Mean Effect Error Mean Effect Error
Had health check up in past year
4th graders 0.957 0.017 0.012 0.967 0.005 0.011
7th graders 0.960 0.030 0.010*** 0.936 0.038 0.014***
9th graders 0.958 0.030 0.014 0.943 −0.003 0.017
Had 2+ dental visits in past year
4th graders 0.634 0.042 0.032 0.464 0.150 0.032***
7th graders 0.596 0.104 0.032*** 0.469 0.148 0.034***
9th graders 0.572 0.131 0.033*** 0.441 0.188 0.035***
Parent-rated health status
4th graders 3.90 0.019 0.067 3.97 0.018 0.066
7th graders 3.92 0.047 0.067 3.92 0.134 0.069*
9th graders 3.81 0.068 0.069 3.86 0.039 0.073
Sources: Baseline survey and 18- and 42-month surveys
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression, controlling for selected
baseline characteristics
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %
Sample sizes for 18-month survey are 911,911 and 870 for 4th, 7th and 9th graders, respectively
Sample sizes for 42-month survey are 939, 905 and 812 for 4th, 7th and 9th graders, respectively
Miller et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:11 Page 21 of 29(7.1 percentage points) was full-time work. This effect is expected, given that the
work rewards were only earned if parents worked 30 or more hours per week.
The bottom panel of the table, showing UI data, tells a different story. The program
appears to have reduced employment in the first year, with no effects thereafter. Family
Rewards offered incentives for all types of full-time employment, so it is not clear why
it would only increase employment in jobs not reported to the UI system, particularly
since individuals had to present adequate documentation in order to earn rewards.15
Other research suggests that the UI data may miss relatively more employment for
low-income populations than for higher-income groups (Abraham et al. 2013). In
addition, smaller employers and employers with high turnover, who tend to employ rela-
tively high numbers of less-skilled workers, tend to underreport earnings to the UI system
more than other types of employers (Burgess et al. 1998).
To look more at the different effects given by the two data sources, we examined ef-
fects on several job characteristics, as reported on the surveys. As shown in the top
panel of the table, the program increased the rate of self-employment by 2.3 percentage
points, suggesting that at least a third of the additional work caused by the program is
not expected to appear on UI records. On the other hand, the program increased em-
ployment in jobs that offer health insurance by 3 percentage points, suggesting that al-
most half of the additional jobs are “formal” jobs that should appear on UI records.
We also looked in more detail at the types of jobs respondents held at the 42-month
point by whether their employment status matched on both data sources. The data re-
veal that more than a third of the jobs that are reported on the survey but not on UI
records are in child care, which may be more likely to be paid in cash or not reported
by employers. In contrast, for respondents for whom both sources indicate employ-
ment, only 2.3% of the employment was in child care. The inconsistency between the




Employed at 18-month survey 0.543 0.056 0.014***
Employed at 42-month survey 0.496 0.064 0.015***
Job at 42-month survey:
30 or more hours per week 0.395 0.049 0.015***
Self-employed 0.049 0.022 0.009**
Offers health insurance 0.269 0.025 0.014*
N = (3082 for 18-month survey; 2966 for 42-month survey)
B. UI records data
Employment rate
Yr 1 0.587 −0.024 0.009***
Yr 2 0.562 −0.012 0.010
Yr 3 0.533 −0.009 0.011
Earnings
Yr 1 12376 −221 223
Yr 2 12601 −257 286
Yr 3 12529 −116 323
N 4993
Sources: Baseline survey, 18- and 42-month surveys and UI records
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression controlling for selected baseline
characteristics. For the estimates in panel B, standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %
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and perhaps employment in the types of jobs that are more likely to be underreported to
the UI system.
To examine heterogeneity in effects, we estimated effects for parents defined by their
education level and employment status at study entry. The results are shown in
Table 14. For parents with higher education levels or more work experience, the em-
ployment effects were more positive than for their more disadvantaged counterparts,
although the differences in impacts across the groups are not statistically significant.
For those with less education and experience, the program led to small increases in
survey-reported employment and reductions in UI-reported work. The reduction in
earnings for the less educated subgroup is concerning. It is not surprising, however,
that those individuals least connected to the labor force may be most likely to reduce
their work effort in response to income earned from the education and health rewards.
Finally, the program did lead to a small increase in the receipt of certificates and as-
sociates degrees (Table 15). These effects are most likely due to parents’ increased in-
comes rather than the training incentives per se, since very few parents received the
training rewards. Only 6% of parents earned at least one training reward over the
three-year program period.
5 Discussion
Family Rewards represents the first test of a comprehensive CCT in the United States.
The program tied cash rewards for low-income families to a variety of activities related





Not working at study entry
Employed at 42-month survey 0.231 0.044 0.023*
Quarterly employment rate yrs 1–3 (UI) 0.204 −0.023 0.015
Total earnings yrs 1–3 (UI) 9405 −457 1041
Working at study entry
Employed at 42-month survey 0.752 0.070 0.021***
Quarterly employment rate yrs 1–3 (UI) 0.754 0.005 0.014
Total earnings yrs 1–3 (UI) 61554 995 1523
B. Education level
No high school diploma/GED
Employed at 42-month survey 0.408 0.032 0.025**
Quarterly employment rate yrs 1–3 (UI) 0.379 −0.033 0.016**/++
Total earnings yrs 1–3 (UI) 20805 −2078 1191*/+
Has high school diploma/GED
Employed at 42-month survey 0.554 0.083 0.020***
Quarterly employment rate yrs 1–3 (UI) 0.558 0.012 0.013
Total earnings yrs 1–3 (UI) 46739 1424 1339
Sources: Baseline survey, 18- and 42-month surveys and UI records
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression controlling for selected baseline
characteristics. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the household level. Statistical significance is indicated as
follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %. Differences between subgroup impacts were tested for statistical significance and
are indicated as follows: +++ = 1 %; ++ = 5 %; + = 10 %
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that the program’s most substantial effects were to reduce poverty and material hard-
ship during the 3 years in which the rewards were offered. The program also led to be-
havioral responses across the three domains, the key to long-term poverty reduction,
although these effects were either small or limited to subgroups. For example, the pro-
gram increased grade progression and graduation rates for proficient 9th graders, but
had no effects for their less proficient peers or on younger students.
The findings for education are consistent with a growing literature documenting that
incentives can increase student effort.16 However, as noted earlier, it is not always clear
that this increased effort while the incentives were offered translates into higher
achievement in the long-run. Family Reward’s effects on attendance and credits earned
for proficient 9th graders also diminished in Year 4, after the program had ended.
The program’s lack of effects for younger students is consistent with findings from
some programs (Fryer 2011) but not with others (Bettinger 2012). One reason for the
lack of effects may be that the incentives were not as salient to the younger students in
Family Rewards. In other programs, the incentives were paid more frequently and were
given directly to the students. In contrast, Family Rewards, like most other CCTs, gave
rewards to the parents and relied on them to communicate the incentives to their chil-
dren.17 Interviews with participants indicated that parents varied widely in terms of
how much they told their younger children about the program.




Participated in education or training since random assignment 0.412 0.010 0.018
Has trade license/certificate 0.503 0.042 0.018**
Has Associate’s degree 0.084 0.024 0.011**
N 2966
Sources: Baseline survey and 42-month survey
Each estimate represents the coefficient on program status from a linear regression, controlling for selected
baseline characteristics
Statistical significance is indicated as follows: *** = 1 %; ** = 5 %; * = 10 %
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reductions in poverty that these families experienced for at least the 3 years of the pro-
gram. There is a growing literature documenting the effects of increased family income
on children’s trajectories, particularly for very young children.18 In addition, as men-
tioned earlier, studies of unconditional versus conditional transfer tend to find positive
schooling effects from both types of transfers, although the findings are from middle-
income countries.
Effects for more academically prepared 9th graders are consistent with other research
that finds that effects of incentives are concentrated largely on students on the margin
of higher performance and, in particular, on those who were reading and language profi-
cient. In some ways, it is to be expected that the effects of incentives would be concen-
trated on those students at the margins, since in the absence of services students were
left to their own devices to earn the rewards. In a similar vein, Fryer (2011) suggests
that a more effective strategy might be to reward inputs to school progress rather than
outputs, since many of the students (and parents) may not know how to improve their
school performance in order to earn the incentives. An alternative, or complement to
this strategy, might be to offer more guidance to families about how to help their chil-
dren perform better in school.
In the health domain, there is little evidence on the effect of incentives to maintain
health insurance, and recent research shows that having health insurance does increase
the use of preventive care (Finkelstein et al. 2012). Family Rewards led to a small in-
crease in rates of health coverage but did not increase preventive doctor visits. Rates of
coverage and care were already quite high for families in the control group, which
raises the question of whether the program might have had larger effects in an area
with lower coverage.
In the work domain, the findings show modest positive effects, albeit only for work
reported on the surveys. They also illustrate the potential for income effects that
dampen work effort. Although reductions in work effort seemed to occur largely for
groups less connected to the labor force, it is also possible that the rewards earned by
individuals in the other two domains dampened the effectiveness of the work rewards
more broadly. The answer may not be to eliminate the work incentives altogether, since
the reductions in work may have been bigger in their absence.
One factor to consider when interpreting the program’s effects is that the Great
Recession began during program year 2. Similarly and in response, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act was passed in early 2009. The Act included direct
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for low-income families and the Earned Income Tax Credit for larger families. It is
not immediately clear how the onset of the recession and the subsequent Recovery
Act should affect program impacts. We did not observe large reductions in income
or employment rates for the sample over the time period, for example, although
high unemployment rates may certainly affect individuals’ employment response to
the program.
Although the results presented here suggest that this version of a CCT is unlikely to
lead to long-term reductions in poverty for most families, the findings have fed into the
next iteration of the model. A modified version of Family Rewards is being replicated
and tested in two cities in the U.S. (New York, New York and Memphis, Tennessee).19
The new model, launched in 2011 in both cities, builds on the lessons learned from this
evaluation. For example, the new program targets families with children who were set
to enter 9th or 10th grade in the upcoming school year. It is much simpler than the
original program, offering only eight incentives instead of 22, across the three domains.
The new program also includes a more active advisement role for the staff, in which
they develop an initial plan with every family and aim to meet with them twice per year
to discuss their progress toward earning the rewards. Finally, the new program at-
tempts to make the rewards more timely (and thus more salient) by disbursing pay-
ments monthly, rather than every 2 months. Rewarding grades, in addition to test
scores, also provides a more immediate incentive for school performance.
Family Rewards was the first test of a CCT in the U.S. and attempted to encourage
families to make more investments in their human capital. In some cases, the incen-
tives worked and in other cases they didn’t. The findings from the evaluation of Family
Rewards add to a growing body of evidence on why families may not follow through on
certain behaviors and which of these behaviors can be changed by incentives.
More broadly, the Great Recession highlighted the need for a safety net in the U.S.
that provides families with adequate support when they need it while also encouraging
self-sufficiency. Some have suggested that a CCT such as Family Rewards could be in-
corporated into or layered on top of a safety net program, such as TANF (Transitional
Assistance for Needy Families). Politically, this program may be more popular and sus-
tainable if it came with these types of strings attached. While it is important to keep in
mind that a non-trivial fraction of families did not earn very much from Family Re-
wards (the bottom fifth of earners, a relatively disadvantaged group, received on average
just over $700 per year from the program), much of the current safety net is condi-
tioned on only one activity—work (particularly, working in the case of the EITC and
looking for work in the case of TANF). This system, the EITC in particular, worked
well when jobs were plentiful but has proven inadequate in a bad labor market (Berlin
2011). Conditioning benefit receipt on a range of productive activities (work, schooling
and health) may be a way to expand benefits to those in need.
Finally, if the CCT idea were to play a larger role in U.S. policy, it is worth consider-
ing its costs. While a full analysis of costs is beyond the scope of this paper, there is no
doubt that the costs are large and that they likely outweigh the benefits, given the mod-
est effects the program had in each of the domains. In addition, an important compo-
nent of the cost is maintaining the payment system and monitoring and compliance for
each of the reward conditions. While it is unlikely that an unconditional cash transfer
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would be one advantage of providing transfers with no strings attached. Political sup-
port for an unconditional cash transfer of this size, however, may be limited.
Endnotes
1This paper is based on results presented in Riccio et al. (2010, 2013).
2For example, see Schultz (2004); Behrman et al. (2001), (2009).
3For reviews, see Fiszbein and Shady (2009); IEG (Independent Evaluation Group)
(2011); Saavedra and Garcia (2012).
4Bettinger (2012) finds some evidence of reduced effort in a program that rewarded
students for achievement on one reading and math test per year. Among students in
the program group who had already earned the maximum incentive from the first test,
the effect of the program was to reduce their performance on the second test.
5New York City officials worked with several banks and credit unions to develop spe-
cial “Opportunity NYC accounts” for participants that carried no fees and came with
overdraft-impossible debit cards.
6The results were very similar when impacts were estimated using models that did
not include these additional controls.
7In practice, families received the rewards in a somewhat lumpy fashion, since several
of the largest rewards were paid out for periodic items such as test scores and Regents
exams. For example, about half of all families received more than 45 percent of their
total payments for the year in just one pay period.
8Regressions of food security and financial well-being on income and other variables,
estimated for the control group only, indicate that both measures are positively corre-
lated with monthly income, with a $100 increase in income increasing food security by
.01 scale points and financial well-being by .04 scale points. The effects presented in
Table 4 are somewhat larger than these regression estimates would suggest, given that
the program increased monthly income by about $350. The difference may be due to
non-linearities in the relationship between income and these material well-being mea-
sures, or to the fact that the program also increased savings and the number of families
with bank accounts, which can also affect perceptions of well-being and food security.
9We calculated attendance rates for all students, including those students who were
no longer enrolled in NYC public schools, in order to preserve the experimental com-
parison. However, test scores and proficiency rates were only calculated for students
who took the tests. Few students were missing test score data (<5%), and the rate of
missing scores did not differ between the program and control groups.
10See Medina (2010).
11To construct “school environment,” we divided schools into thirds based on the
pass rates of earlier cohorts. Effects were then estimated separately for the bottom
third, the middle third, and the top third schools. Separate models, interacting pass
rates with treatment status, showed similar results.
12See United Hospital Fund (2009) for a list of reforms New York State implemented
in 2007. That report documents that in the year after the reforms were introduced,
85% of eligible children were covered by Medicaid or the State’s Children’s Health
Insurance Program, a rate substantially above the national average. Similarly, data for
2009 from the U.S. Census Bureau indicate that the percentage of low-income children
Miller et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:11 Page 27 of 29without insurance was lower in New York than the U.S., and the rate of government-
provided coverage for this group was higher in New York than in the U.S. on average.
13An interesting, yet more speculative, finding is that the program seems to have im-
proved self-rated health status and reduced the reported incidence of asthma among
parents who had the poorest health at study entry. This finding should be interpreted
with some caution, however, given that the analysis by health status was not pre-
specified. In addition, the effects on asthma are not easily explained by other effects
(such as a reduction in smoking, or an increase in the rate of preventive doctor visits).
14A recent study also documents effects of poor oral health on labor market out-
comes (Glied and Neidell 2010).
15To earn a reward for full-time work, participants were required to submit along
with the mail-in coupon either a pay stub indicating weekly hours worked during the
given activity period or, if weekly hours are not indicated on pay stubs, a letter on offi-
cial letterhead from their employer providing this information.
16A sub-study within Family Rewards also found, using a survey of 9th graders, that
the program increase, proficient 9th graders’ time spent in academic activities, suggest-
ing the mechanism by which the program had its effects; see Morris et al. (2012).
17Rewards were not paid directly to younger students for practical reasons and be-
cause many parents would not have wanted their children to be given the sometimes
large sums of money provided through the program.
18See, for example, Dahl and Lochner (2012); Duncan et al. (2012); Miller et al.
(2008).
19The replication is funded through grants provided by the federal Social Innovation
Fund (SIF) and private funders.
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor Policy is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The authors declared
that they observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
We thank two anonymous referees for comments on an earlier draft. At MDRC, we thank Gordon Berlin, William
Corrin, Richard Hendra and John Hutchins for valuable comments and Jared Smith and Gilda Azurdia for leading the
data analysis. MDRC is evaluating Family Rewards Demonstration through a contract with the Mayor’s Fund to
Advance New York City and under the direction of the New York City Center for Economic Opportunity. Funding for
the project is provided by Bloomberg Philanthropies, The Rockefeller Foundation, The Starr Foundation, the Open
Society Institute, the Robin Hood Foundation, the Tiger Foundation, The Annie E. Casey Foundation, American
International Group, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the New York Community Trust. The
findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this article are entirely those of the authors.
Responsible editor: David Neumark
Received: 3 January 2015 Accepted: 6 May 2015
References
Abraham K, Haltiwanger JC, Sandusky K, Spletzer J (2013) “Exploring Differences in Household vs. Establishment
Measures of Employment.” J Labor Econ 31.2 pt 2:S129–S172
Akresh R, de Walque D, Kazianga H (2013) Cash Transfers and Child Schooling: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation
of the Role of Conditionality. Impact Evaluation Series No 82
Angrist J, Lavy V (2009) “The effect of high-stakes high school achievement awards: evidence from a school-centered
randomized trial”. Am Econ Rev 99 4:1384–1414
Angrist J, Lang D, Oreopoulos P (2009) Incentives and services for college achievement: evidence from a randomized
trial. Am Econ J Appl Econ 1(1):136–163
Baez JE, Camacho A (2011) “Assessing the Long-Term Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers on Human Capital: Evidence
from Colombia”. Policy Research Working Paper No. 5681. World Bank, Washington, DC, United States
Baird S, McIntosh C, Özler B (2011) Cash or condition? Evidence from a randomized cash transfer program. Q J Econ
126(4):1709–1753
Baird S, Ferreira F, Ozler B, Woolcock M (2014) Conditional, unconditional and everything in between: a systematic
review of the effects of cash transfer programs on schooling outcomes. J Dev Effect 6(1):1–43
Miller et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:11 Page 28 of 29Barham T, Macours K, Maluccio JA (2013) “More Schooling and More Learning? Effects of a Three-Year Conditional Cash
Transfer Program in Nicaragua After 10 Years,” Inter-American Development Bank Working Paper, No. IDB-WP-432
Behrman J, Sengupta P, Todd P (2001) Progressing through PROGRESA: An Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy
Experiment. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC
Behrman JR, Parker SW, Todd PE (2009) Medium-Term Impacts of the Oportunidades Conditional Cash Transfer Program
on Rural Youth in Mexico. In: Klasen S, Nowak-Lehmann F (eds) Poverty, Inequality and Policy in Latin America. MIT
Press, Cambridge, United States, pp 219–270
Benabou R, Tirole J (2003) Intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Rev Econ Stud 80:3
Benhassine N, Devoto F, Duflo E, Dupas P, Pouliquen V (forthcoming) “Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A “Labeled Cash
Transfer” for Education”. Am Econ J Econ Policy. (see NBER Working Paper No. 19227)
Berlin G (2011) “The Labor Market After the Great Recession: Implications for Income Support Policy” Remarks at the
2011 Welfare Research and Evaluation Conference, Sponsored by the Office of Planning, Research and Evaluation,
Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
Bettinger EP (2012) “Paying to Learn: The Effect of Financial Incentives on Elementary School Test Scores”. The Review
of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press 94(3):686–698
Bloom HS, Unterman R (2012) Sustained positive effects on graduation rates produced by New York City’s small public
high schools of choice. MDRC, Policy Brief. New York
Burgess PL, Blakemore AE, Low SA (1998) Using Statistical Profiles to Improve Unemployment Insurance Tax
Compliance. In: Bassi LJ, Woodbury SA (eds) Reform of the Unemployment Insurance System. JAI Press, Stamford,
CT, pp 243–271
Cole N, Fox MK (2004) Nutrition and Health Characteristics of Low-Income Populations. USDA, Economic Research
Service, Washington DC
Dahl G, Lochner L (2012) The Impact of Family Income on Child Achievement: Evidence From Changes in the Earned
Income Tax Credit. Am Econ Rev 102(5):1927–1956
Deci EL, Koestner R, Ryan R (2001) A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on
intrinsic motivation. Psychol Bull 125:627–668
Duncan GJ, Magnuson K, Kalil A, Ziol-Guest K (2012) The importance of early childhood poverty. Soc Indic Res
108(1):87–98
Eisenberger R, David Pierce W, Cameron J (1999) Effects of reward on intrinsic motivation—negative, neutral and
positive: comment on Deci, Koestner and Ryan. Psychol Bull 125:677–691
Eissa N, Hoynes H (2006) “Behavioral responses to taxes: the earned income tax credit and labor supply”. In:
Poterba, James M. (ed.) Tax Policy and the Economy, Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press.
20:74–110.
Finkelstein A, Tabuman S, Wright B, Bernstein M, Gruber J, Newhouse JP, Allen H, Baicker K and the Oregon Health
Study Group (2012) The Oregon health insurance experiment: evidence from the first year. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 127(3):1057–1106
Fisher-Owens SA, Barker JC, Adams S, Chung LH, Gansky SA, Hyde S, Weintraub JA (2008) Giving policy some teeth:
routes to reducing disparities in oral health. Health Aff 27(2):404–412
Fiszbein A, Shady N (2009) Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty. The World Bank,
Washington D.C.
Fryer R (2011) Financial incentives and student achievement: evidence from randomized trials. Q J Econ
126(4):1755–1798
Glied S, Neidell M (2010) The economic value of teeth. J Hum Resour 45(2):468–496
Hendra R, Riccio JA, Dorsett R, Greenberg DH, Knight G, Phillips J, Robins PK, Vegeris S, Walter J (2011) Final Evidence
from the UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) Demonstration. MDRC, New York
Holt S (2006) The Earned Income Tax Credit at 30: What We Know. Brookings Institution, Washington DC
IEG (Independent Evaluation Group) (2011) Evidence and Lessons Learned from Impact Evaluations on Social Safety
Nets. World Bank, Washington, DC, United States
Jackson CK (2010) A little now for a lot later: a look at a Texas advanced placement incentive program. J Hum Resour
45(3):591–639
Kane R, Johnson P, Town R, Butler M (2004) Economic Incentives for Preventive Care. Agency for Health Research and
Quality, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington DC
Lagarde M, Haines A, Palmer N (2007) Conditional cash transfers for improving uptake of health interventions in low-
and middle-income Countries. A systematic review. J Am Med Assoc 298(16):1900–1910
Leuven E, Oosterbeek H, van der Klaauw B (2010) The effect of financial rewards on students’ achievement: evidence
from a randomized experiment. J Eur Econ Assoc 8(6):1243–1265
Martinson K, Hendra R (2006) Results from the Texas Site in the Employment Retention and Advancement Project.
MDRC, New York
Medina J (2010) Standards Raised, More Students Fail Tests. The New York Times. 28 July 2010. Website:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/29/education/29scores.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
Michalopoulos C (2005) Does Making Work Pay Still Pay? MDRC, New York
Miller C, Huston AC, Duncan GJ, McLoyd VC, Weisner TS (2008) New Hope for the Working Poor: Effects After Eight
Years for Families and Children. MDRC, New York
Miller C, van Dok M, Tessler B (2012) Strategies to Help Low-Wage Workers Advance: Implementation and Final Impacts
of the Work Advancement and Support Center (WASC) Demonstration. MDRC, New York
Morris P, Lawrence Aber J, Wolf S, Berg J (2012) Using Incentives to Change How Teenagers Spend Their Time. The
Effects o New York City’s Conditional Cash Transfer Program. MDRC, New York
Patel R, Rudd T (2012) Can Scholarships Alone Help Students Succeed? Lessons from Two New York City Community
Colleges. MDRC, New York
Paxson C, Shady N (2010) Does money matter? The effects of cash transfers on child health and development in rural
Ecuador. Econ Dev Cult Chang 59(1):187–229
Miller et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy  (2015) 4:11 Page 29 of 29Riccio J, Dechausay N, Greenberg D, Miller C, Rucks Z, Verma N (2010) Toward Reduced Poverty Across Generations:
Early Findings from New York City’s Conditional Cash Transfer Program. MDRC, New York
Riccio J, Verma N, Dechausay N, Miller C, Nunez S, Yang E (2013) Conditional Cash Transfers in New York City: The
Continuing Story of the Opportunity NYC-Family Rewards Demonstration. MDRC, New York
Saavedra JE, Garcia S (2012) “Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers on Educational Outcomes in Developing Countries:
A Meta-analysis”. RAND Corporation Working Papers, WR-921-1.
Schultz TP (2004) School subsidies for the poor: evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty Program. J Dev Econ
74(1):199–250
Sindelar J (2008) Paying for performance: the power of incentives over habits. Health Econ 17:449–451
Skinner BF (1974) About Behaviorism. Random House, New York
Synder CR, Sympson SC, Ybasco FC, Borders TF, Babyak MA, Higgins RL (1996) Development and validation of the state
hope scale. J Pers Soc Psychol 70(2):321–335
United Hospital Fund (2009) Improving Enrollment and Retention in Medicaid and CHIP: Federal Options for a
Changing Landscape. United Hospital Fund, New York
Volpp KG, Loewenstein G, Troxel AB, Doshi J, Price M, Laskin M, Kimmel SE (2008a) A test of financial incentives to
improve warfarin adherence. BMC Health Serv Res 8:272
Volpp KG, John LK, Troxel AB, Norton L, Fassbender J, Loewenstein G (2008b) Financial incentive-based approaches for
weight loss: a randomized trial. J Am Med Assoc 300(22):2631–2637
Volpp KG, Troxel AB, Pauly MV, Glick HA, Puig A, Asch DA, Gavin R, Zhu J, Wan F, DeGuzman J, Corbett E, Weiner J,
Audrain-McGovern J (2009) Ä randomized controlled trial of financial incentives for smoking cessation. N Engl J
Med 306(7):699–709Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
